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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(j) 
(1953 as amended).1 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case is an appeal from a final order from the Third Judicial District Court of Summit 
County, State of Utah, entered by the Honorable Pat B. Brian, originally on December 30, 1997 
which order was subsequently substantially modified by Judge William B. Bohling on February 
18, 1998. The Court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the subsequent award 
of fees and costs signed March 10, 1998 by Judge Donald Nohring for Judge Bohling. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This appeal is from the Trial Court's grant of a motion of summary judgment to the 
plaintiff/appellee. Each of the issues presented and their appropriate standards of review are set 
forth below. 
I. Did the Court inappropriately award ownership of the condominium to Scott? 
When reviewing a summary judgment, the party against whom the judgment is granted is 
entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered 
in the light most favorable to them. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
II. Did the Court err in ruling on the motions for summary judgment when they had not been 
submitted for decision? 
hereafter all references to the Utah Code Annotated shall be to the 1953 code as amended 
unless otherwise noted. 
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This issue is a matter of statutory construction, it is a question of law that requires no 
deference to the District Court's interpretation. See Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). 
III. Did the Trial Court err in awarding Scott set-off damages? 
This is a question of law that requires no deference to the District Court's holding. See 
Jensen v. Bountiful Citv. 20 Utah 2d 159, 435 P.2d 284 (1967). 
IV. Did the Trial Court err in awarding Scott damages under the doctrine of recoupment? 
This is a question of law that requires no deference to the District Court's holding. See 
Jensen v. Bountiful Citv. 20 Utah 2d 159, 435 P.2d 284 (1967). 
V. Did the Trial Court err in the amount that it awarded in damages, costs and attorneys fees? 
The issues presented under this argument are mixed questions of law and fact. Appellate 
courts give deference to the Trial Court's findings of fact, and will not set them aside unless they 
find them clearly erroneous. Legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness and afforded no 
deference. Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed for a base of direction in applying the 
law to the facts. Woodhausen Apartments v. Washington. 942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISION STATUTE AND RULES 
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are reproduced herein as Addendum "B" 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of a contract entered into for the sale of a condominium located in Park 
City, Utah. 
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A disagreement arose between Ms. Majors, who was the owner of the condominium and 
Mr. Scott who was the assignee of a Mr. Knapp who had entered into the real estate purchase 
contract with Ms. Majors. Ms. Majors claimed that the agreement was void due to fraud and 
refused to sell the condominium to Scott in accordance with the written terms of the contract. Mr. 
Scott brought suit in the Third District Court for Summit County seeking specific performance of 
the real estate purchase contract. 
Mr. Scott filed a motion for summary judgement requesting the court grant him specific 
performance against Ms. Majors. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on 
January 29, 1996. 
Ms. Majors appealed the trial courts decision. In an unpublished decision dated April 10, 
1997 the Utah Court of Appeals in case number 960536-CA denied Ms. Majors appeal finding that 
even though Ms. Majors had set forth sufficient facts to show fraud in the inducement, her claim 
failed because Ms. Majors could not have reasonably relied on the misrepresentations made by 
Knapp. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Trial Court was affirmed. That judgment required Ms. 
Majors to sell the property to Scott in accordance with the terms of the REPC. The parties dispute 
what occurred next. Ms. Majors claims that she attempted to sell the property to Scott upon the 
terms of the REPC, but that Scott, through his counsel, insisted on additional terms including a 
mutual release of claims and the withholding of funds at closing to cover attorneys fees in the prior 
law suit. Scott's counsel claims Majors would not sell the property in accordance with the terms 
of the REPC. 
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Scott's counsel filed a motion for summary judgment seeking an award of attorneys fees 
and costs from the original law suit. The matter was scheduled for a hearing on July 14, 1997. On 
July 10, 1997 Ms. Majors filed bankruptcy in the state of California. 
Both Scott and his counsel were listed as debtors in the bankruptcy. On October 31, 1997 
Ms. Majors received a discharge in bankruptcy. Thereafter Scott filed an amended memorandum 
again requesting costs and fees entitled a motion for summary judgment. That matter was 
originally scheduled for hearing in November of 1997, but the hearing was delayed until early 
December 1997. At that time Scott also filed a Motion for Order Establishing Terms and 
Conditions of Conveyance of Real Property. In the prayer for relief, this motion was also termed 
a motion for summary judgment. 
On December 30, 1997 the Court entered a judgment establishing Scott's right to offset the 
contract purchase price against Scott's cost, damages and attorneys fees, and awarding the real 
property to Scott. 
Thereafter Scott filed another Motion for Order Establishing Terms and Conditions of 
Conveyance of Real Property. The motion substantially modified the Order of December 30, 
1997. That motion was granted by order dated February 17, 1998. On March 10, 1998 additional 
fees and costs were granted. Subsequently this appeal was brought by Ms. Majors. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Linda Majors (hereafter "Ms. Majors") is a resident of the State of California. R.9 
2. Ms. Majors was the owner of a condominium known as Carriage House Condo #407 
located in Park City, Utah. R.8 
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3. In September of 1994 Ms. Majors was contacted by a Mr. Gary Krall who offered to 
purchase the condominium. R.393 
4. Ms. Majors declined. R.393 
5. In the next couple of months Ms. Majors business in California suffered some financial 
setbacks. Accordingly, in November she decided to accept Mr. Krall's offer. R.136 
6. At that time, however, Ms. Majors could not recall Mr. Krall's name or phone number and 
accordingly in December she contacted Lynne Richmond ("Richmond") who represented the 
property management company that rented the condominium on Ms. Majors behalf. R.392 
7. It was Ms. Majors belief that Mr. Krall had previously been referred to her by Richmond. 
8. Richmond would not give Mr. Krall's name to Ms. Majors, instead she provided the name 
of another prospective buyer, a Mr. Ed Knapp ("Knapp"). R.392 
9. Ms. Majors later discovered that Richmond did not have a contract to manage Mr. Krall's 
condominiums while she did have such an agreement with Knapp. R.392 
10. Knapp also was a resident of California and a real estate agent or broker. R. 135 
11. Knapp approached Ms. Majors at her shop in California. R.153 
12. Knapp represented to Ms. Majors that he would purchase the condominium for $37,500 
and that payment would be made within 48 hours. R.41 
13. During this visit Knapp contacted Park City Title Company, which he represented to Ms. 
Majors handled all of his closings, and had them fax him a Utah Real Estate Purchase Contract 
(REPC). 
14. Knapp filled out the REPC. R. 136 
15. Ms. Majors signed the document without reading it thoroughly. R.135 
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16. Knapp did not provide payment within 48 hours as promised. R. 134 
17. That condition was not listed in the signed REPC. R.66 
18. In January of 1995 Knapp phoned Ms. Majors and informed her that he and a gentleman 
named Steve Scott ("Scott") were in Park City to raise money for the condominium. 
19. Ms. Majors informed Knapp that she was not willing to sell at the previous cash price as 
the payment had not been made within 48 hours as promised. R.74 
20. Park City Title Company faxed Ms. Majors a letter informing her that she had to sell the 
condominium at the previously agreed upon price. R.72 
21. Upon advise from some attorneys she had contacted, Ms. Majors informed everyone that 
she was not willing to go through with the sale of the condominium based on the misrepresentation 
that had been made with respect to the 48 hour purchase. R.70 
22. In February of 1995 Ms. Majors received a letter from Mary Ann Hansen identifying 
herself as Mr. Scott's attorney. R.70 
23. Ms. Hansen demanded Ms. Majors sell the condominium at the $37,500 price and 
furthermore that she pay $20,000 in damages to Mr. Scott or that she would file a Lis Pendens 
preventing Ms. Majors from selling the property. R.70 
24. Ms. Majors refused to accede to Scott's demands and in February of 1995 Hansen filed a 
Lis Pendens. R.40 
25. This was filed even though no lawsuit had been filed in violation of statute. R.40 
26. In April of 1995 Hansen filed a complaint on Scott's behalf against Ms. Majors alleging 
breach of contract. R.9 
6 
27. Attached to the complaint was a copy of the Utah REPC which Ms. Majors had signed. 
Unlike the copy that Ms. Majors had, the copy attached to the complaint had been signed by Scott 
and the date line was left blank. R.3-4 
28. In July of 1995 Ms. Majors retained John Musselman to represent her in the civil action. 
R.37 
29. At the time Ms. Majors retained Mr. Musselman she was not aware that he had previously 
had his license suspended three times. 
30. Musselman filed an answer and counterclaim. R.48 
31. Scott filed a motion for summary judgment. R.57 
32. No responsive was filed in opposition by Musselman. See Index 
33. The REPC attached to the memorandum in support differed from the one in the Complaint 
and that it was now dated as well as signed by Scott. R. at 96 R. at 2. 
34. After oral argument the Court ruled in favor of Scott and ordered the condominium sold 
to him under the Doctrine of Specific Performance. R.130 
35. Ms. Majors retained new counsel and filed an appeal of the Trial Courts decision. R. 138 
36. In the decision rendered in April of 1997 the Utah Court of Appeals found that while there 
existed issues of material fact as to whether or not Ms. Majors was mislead into signing the 
REPC, her failure to read the REPC meant that she had not reasonably relied upon the 
misrepresentations that had been made and accordingly she was ordered to sell the condominium 
to Scott under the terms of the REPC. R. 168-169 
37. At the time of the Court's original order the issue of costs and attorneys fees had been 
taken under advisement and no ruling had been made. R. 168-169 
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38. After the Court's decision, Ms. Majors contacted Susan Johnson an escrow officer with 
Associated Title Company and asked her to handle the sale of the condominium to Scott. R.376 
39. In May of 1996 Ms. Majors received a phone call from Susan Johnson who advised Ms. 
Majors that Scott would not purchase the property under the terms of the REPC. R.376 
40. Scott was insisting on a mutual release together with the payment of Hansen's attorneys 
fees from the proceeds of the sale. R.398 
41. Ms. Majors then contacted a real estate attorney in California named Wacy Armstrong, Jr., 
to handle negotiations with Hansen. Hansen faxed a mutual release agreement to Armstrong 
demanding Ms. Majors sign the same within 24 hours. Ms. Majors refused. R.398 
42. Scott filed a motion seeking attorneys fees and costs from the Court. R. 180 
43. The matter was scheduled for a hearing on July 14, 1997. R. 173 
44. On July 10, 1997 Ms. Majors filed bankruptcy in California. R.357 
45. Scott and Hansen were listed as creditors in the bankruptcy. R.358 
46. The condominium was abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee. R.409 
47. Scott and Hansen were discharged in the bankruptcy. R.356 
48. In November of 1997 Scott filed a motion seeking an order from the Court awarding "set-
off' damages to be taken from the proceeds otherwise due for the purchase of the condominium 
and ordering Associated Title to execute the transfer documents even if Majors refused to do so. 
R.269-R.32Q 
49. Ms. Majors and Armstrong sent letters to the Court requesting an extension of time for Ms. 
Majors to obtain Utah counsel and to resist this issue. In the interim Ms. Majors sent copies of the 
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documents from the bankruptcy court showing the claims for damages by Hansen and Scott had 
been discharged in the bankruptcy. R.320, R.356, R.359-R.372 
50. The Trial Court extended the hearing until the first part of December. R.373 
51. Ms. Majors was unable to retain counsel by that time and did not have the funds to travel 
to Utah herself. R.409 
52. The Court held the hearing and took the matter under advisement. R. 465 
53. In December of 1997 Ms. Majors filed a civil complaint in the State of California against 
Ed Knapp based upon his misrepresentations. R.510 
54. On the basis of that law suit a Lis Pendens was filed with respect to the condominium in 
the State of Utah. R.510 
55. On December 30, 1997 Judge Bryan entered an order granting Scott's motion for set-off 
and ordering Associated Title to execute the necessary documents to transfer the property. R.467-
470 
56. In February of 1998 a hearing was scheduled on Scott's motion to release the Lis Pendens 
that had been filed against the property. R.477 
57. Ms. Majors had contacted and retained Dana Facemeyer for the purposes of that hearing. 
58. At that hearing the Court released the Lis Pendens without notice of pendency of the 
motion that modified the prior order of December 1997. R.515 
59. After the hearing Ms. Hansen took the order to the Olympia Hotel and had Lynn Richmond 
change the locks to the condominium. 
60. Since that time Ms. Majors had been denied access to the property and has further been 
denied the opportunity to recover her personal property. 
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61. On March 10, 1998 Judge Donald Nehring signed an order granting additional fees and 
costs. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case comes before the Court on an appeal from an award of summary judgment 
awarding ownership of a condominium in Park City, Utah together with costs, fees, and damages 
to the Plaintiff Scott. 
In reviewing a Motion for Summary Judgment all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom 
are drawn in the favor of the party opposing the motion. The facts as set forth by Ms. Majors 
demonstrate that the original purchase contract was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. 
When Ms. Majors refused to go through with the sale, Scott brought the initial action in the 
District Court to force specific performance. 
The Trial Court found that the contract itself was plain and ambiguous and was unwilling 
to allow parol evidence which Ms. Majors attempted to introduce to demonstrate that the contract 
was procured through fraud. 
On appeal the Utah Court of Appeals held that while there were issues of material fact with 
respect to how the contract was obtained, the fact that the contract was short and concise and that 
Ms. Majors had failed to read the contract thoroughly at the time she signed it meant that any 
reliance on the misrepresentations was unreasonable. Since reasonable reliance is a criterion for 
finding fraud, the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's original ruling and remanded the 
case. 
The Trial Court's original order had ordered Ms. Majors to comply with the terms of the 
real estate purchase contract. Ms. Majors claims that she attempted to close as per the REPC, but 
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that Scott by and through his counsel refused to close the transaction unless Ms. Majors agreed 
to a mutual release together with allowing a set off for attorneys fees and cost against the sales 
proceeds. There had not at that time been an actual order setting the amount of costs and attorneys 
fees as that issue had been taken under advisement by the Court at the time it entered its original 
judgment. 
Scott filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking his attorneys fees, costs and damages. 
That motion was scheduled for hearing on July 14, 1997. On July 10, 1997 Ms. Majors filed 
bankruptcy in the State of California. In the bankruptcy proceeding the bankruptcy trustee 
abandoned the condominium back to Ms. Majors. Ms. Majors received a discharge in bankruptcy 
on November 20, 1997. 
After receiving notice of the discharge, Scott filed an amended pleading seeking attorneys 
fees, costs and damages. Scott then filed a additional pleading requesting the court order 
Associated Title Company to execute the documents necessary to transfer the ownership of the 
condominium to Scott if Ms. Majors was unwilling to do so. No notice to submit for decision was 
submitted with this decision. 
The Court held a hearing the first week of December to consider Scott's motions. Ms. 
Majors was not present and was not represented by counsel. The Court took the matter under 
advisement and on December 30, 1997 awarded Scott his fees, costs and damages. The award was 
made purportedly under the provisions of the bankruptcy code allowing set off and also under the 
Doctrine of Recoupment. 
The Doctrine of Set off was raised directly by Scott in his initial brief but the Doctrine of 
Recoupment was not raised until he had filed his reply brief. 
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A review of relevant case law shows that neither the Doctrine of Set off nor Recoupment 
could have or should have been applied against the debt owing to Ms. Majors in this case. Those 
doctrines are only available against the trustee in bankruptcy and not against the debtor herself. 
Pursuant to Federal Bankruptcy law therefore no award of costs or fees could be made to 
the Plaintiff and indeed the Plaintiff was precluded from additional court efforts to obtain those 
fees and costs, which resulted in additional fees and costs which were awarded by the Court. 
The Court never appears to have addressed the issue of Ms. Majors compliance with the 
prior Court's order which obligated her to fulfill her duties under the terms of the REPC. The 
Plaintiff failed to address those points by sworn testimony, Ms. Majors is therefore allowed to rely 
on her pleadings which specifically claimed that she had tried to fulfill her obligations but that 
Scott had insisted on a mutual release and a set off of fees before he would close. This demand for 
set off was even before any fees had been awarded. Construing the facts of this case in the way 
most favorable to Ms. Majors establishes that she had fully complied with the prior Court's order 
which had been upheld by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly the demands by Scott for additional 
conditions and terms not included in the REPC resulted either in a material breach of the contract 
or a counteroffer which was rejected by Ms. Majors thereby voiding the contract. Since Ms. 
Majors had no duty thereafter to sell the condominium to Scott the Court's awarding of the 
condominium ot Scott is plain err. 
Even if the Court correctly awarded the property to Scott, the amount of attorneys fees, 
costs and damages is incorrect as a matter of law. The costs include costs that are not directly 
pertaining to this law suit. In the statement of costs it specifically states that they are costs incurred 
after December 30, 1997. They included service of process in California, a filing fee to attack a 
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lis pendens, and overnight mailing fees. The overnight mailing fees are not allowable costs in and 
of themselves. The other costs relate to the action taking place in the State of California. If Scott 
wants to recover fees in that case he must prevail in that court and receive an award in that court. 
He cannot piggyback his demands for attorneys fees and costs in this case with actions he is taking 
in another forum in a completely different matter. 
In addition Scott has receive damages to which he is not entitled. For example, the Court 
had property taxes for the year 1997 paid directly from funds that were to go to Ms. Majors. This 
is in spite of the fact that part of the damages that Scott has claimed are rents for the entire year 
of 1997. Clearly he cannot have both the rents and force Ms. Majors to pay the fees and costs 
associated with the condominium. In addition Scott seeks to recover all of his costs incident with 
the aborted purchase of the property. Clearly those costs would have had to have been incurred 
had he purchased the property. If he is going to receive the property he cannot receive back the 
money that he would have had to expend in order to purchase it. If he is able to do that he is 
receiving a windfall and a double award. 
Scott is not entitled to the property because the facts as plead by Ms. Majors shows that 
she has complied with the Court's order and Scott breached the REPC relieving Ms. Majors of 
the duty to transfer the property to him. Scott is not entitled to his damages, costs, and attorneys 
fees because they have been discharged in bankruptcy. Scott would not be entitled to the requested 
fees, costs and damages in any event as they are overstated, double counted and they are not 
allowable. 
Ms. Majors therefore respectfully request the Court remand this case to the trial court for 
full consideration of the performance of the various parties with respect to the obligations imposed 
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upon them by the REPC, after the Court of Appeals decision, and for the Court to further direct 
the Court as to the disallowance of all costs, fees and damages purportedly incurred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED OWNERSHIP OF THE CONDOMINIUM 
TO SCOTT. 
This matter came before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment. In reviewing 
Scott's request for summary judgment the court was obligated to accept the facts plead by the 
defendant, the party opposing the motion for summary judgement, and all inferences therefrom 
in the way that is most favorable to Ms. Majors. Bihlmaier v. Carlson. 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). 
Unfortunately the Court appears to have begun its consideration of this matter at the point 
of transferring the property to Scott. There was no order that the property be surrendered to Scott, 
the only order, in the judgement and order that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was that 
Ms. Majors comply with the terms of the REPC. According to the facts as pled by Ms. Majors, 
she attempted to comply with the Court's order. She contacted Associated Title Company and 
requested that they close the transaction in accordance with the REPC. 
Scott, however, was not willing to close the deal on the terms of the REPC. Scott, by and 
through his counsel, insisted on a mutual release and upon payment of what Scott deemed to be 
his damages and fees. Neither of those two items were required by the REPC. 
When Ms. Majors refused to accede to these additional demands, Scott refused to purchase 
the property. Instead, Scott proceeded to attempt to obtain a judgment for attorneys fees and costs 
and later to get the Court to simply hand the property over to him directly. 
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Scott's insistence that Majors escrow money to provide a set-off for any claims that he had 
and to provide a mutual release of claims between the parties before he would close constitute 
either a breach of the REPC or in the alternative constitute a counteroffer which Ms. Majors 
declined. In either case Ms. Majors was no longer under any obligation to sell the condominium 
to Scott after he had failed to purchase it under the terms of the REPC. 
Since Majors was no longer under obligation to sell the condominium, the Court's order 
giving possession and purported ownership to Scott is in error and the Court's award of attorneys 
fees and costs is in error as it was Scott who breached the agreement after the ruling of the Court 
of Appeals and not Majors. Ms. Majors therefore respectfully requests this court reverse the 
granting of summary judgment to the Plaintiff and restore the property to Ms. Majors pending the 
resolution of the factual issues in the Trial Court below. 
II. THE MOTIONS WERE NOT RIPE FOR CONSIDERATION AND ACCORDINGLY 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE SAME. 
The Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires a notice to submit for decision be filed 
with the court before a motion can be considered for decision. Rule 4-501(d) states in pertinent 
part: "If neither party files a notice the motion will not be submitted for decision." 
Scott did not file a notice to submit for decision for his motion for attorneys fees and costs, 
or for either of the two motions for summary judgment seeking the Courts order in transferring 
the property. 
Scott argues that he complied with the rule because he served a notice of hearing with his 
motions. Nothing in the rules states that a notice of hearing can substitute for a notice to submit 
for decision. The plain language of the Rule states that a notice to submit must be filed. Rules and 
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statutes are to be interpreted according to their plain language. Gohler v. Wood. 919 P.2d 561, 
562 (Utah 1996). Because the motion was not properly submitted for decision no decision should 
have been rendered and the matter should be remanded. 
III. SCOTT'S CLAIMS FOR COSTS, ATTORNEYS FEES AND DAMAGES ARE 
BARRED BY THE UNTIED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE. 
It is undisputed by the parties that Ms. Majors filed for bankruptcy on July 10, 1997. It 
is undisputed by the parties that prior to the filing of bankruptcy there had been no award of costs 
or attorneys fees or other damages. It is also undenied that both Scott and his counsel were listed 
as creditors in the bankruptcy and that Ms. Majors received a discharge in the bankruptcy. Scott 
claims, however, that he is entitled to a set-off for costs, fees, and damages pursuant to 11 USC 
§ 553. In the case of In re IML Freight. Inc. 65 B.R. 788, (Bankr. D. Utah 1986), the Court set 
forth a discussion of the application of Section 553 and set-off in general. The Court stated: 
Set-off is the right that exists between two parties to net their respective debts where each 
party, as a result of unrelated transactions owes the other an ascertained amount. In any 
action brought for the larger debt, only the balance would be recoverable . . . Although 
the principal of set-off is not complicated its application in the bankruptcy context has been 
the source of much litigation. Section 553 provides that bankruptcy "does not effect the 
right of the creditor to off-set a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case . . . against the claim of such creditor against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case . . . " Section 553 essentially 
preserves, with some changes, the right of set off in bankruptcy cases found in former 
Section 60 under the Bankruptcy Act. Generally speaking, a creditor may set off a mutual 
debt owed by the Creditor to the Debtor against a claim by the creditor against the debtor, 
where the claim and the debt both arose before the commencement of the case . . . the 
statute contains several exceptions and limitations. First, the debt to be set-off must be 
allowable. Second, the claim to be set off may not have been transferred to the creditor 
after 90 days before filing while the debtor was insolvent. Third, the claim may not be one 
incurred during the 90-day period before filing while the debtor was insolvent for the 
purpose of retaining the right of set off. 
In re IML Freight. Inc. at 791. 
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The claims for fees, damages, and costs made by Scott in this case violate all or in part the 
first and third restrictions placed on set-off by 11 USC Section 553(a)(1). 
A, The Debt To Be Set-off Is Not Allowable. 
The first and most important violation of the right of set off is that the debt to be set off 
must be allowable. As chief support for his right of set-off Scott cites the case of In re Davidovic. 
901 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1990). This case, however, does not support Scott's position at all. At 
page 1539 in footnote 4 the 10th Circuit clearly states that while it is willing to recognize the 
applicability of set-off in claims against the estate of the debtor in the bankruptcy context it was 
not holding that such a claim for set off could be made directly against the debtor outside the 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
In that footnote the Court specifically cites to the case of In re Johnson, 13 B.R. 185 
(Bankr. M.D. of Tenn 1981). In In re Johnson the Court held: 
The set-off provisions of Section 533(a), like its predecessor in the old act, permit a 
creditor to off-set a prepetition debt owed the debtor against a claim against the bankruptcy 
estate. They do not allow a prepetition creditor to off-set a claim against the debtor that has 
been discharged against a post petition liability to the debtor, regardless of whether the 
cause of action may have arisen prior to the bankruptcy. 
In re Johnson at 189. 
The Johnson Court decision is firmly based in the actual language of the code. 11 USC § 
524(a)(2) states in pertinent part: 
(a) a discharge in a case under this title - . . . . (2) operates as an injunction against 
the commencement or continuation of any action, the employment of process, or any act 
to collect, recover, or offset any such debt [discharged under Section 727, 944, 1141, or 
1348 of this title] as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the debtor, 
whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; . . . . 
(emphasis added) 
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The code by its plain language does not permit an off-set to be made against the debtor or 
the debtor's property outside or after the bankruptcy. That is exactly what Scott is seeking here. 
The property was abandoned back to Ms. Majors by the trustee. The rights to the cash 
from the sale of the property likewise go to Ms. Majors. Because the claims for fees and costs and 
damages were discharged by the bankruptcy court Scott has no right nor ability to pursue those 
claims in any fashion at this point. 
The Trial Court's award of these costs and damages to Scott is clearly against the statute 
and it must therefore be reversed. 
B. Scott Has Been Allowed To Set-off Costs And Fees Incurred Within the 90-Day 
Period. 
Under Section 553 no set-off is allowed when the debt is incurred within 90-days prior to 
filing of bankruptcy action. It is undisputed that the bankruptcy action was filed on July 10, 1997. 
Notwithstanding that restriction, the affidavit of attorneys fees submitted on November 17,1997 
to the Third District Court contains fees incurred during the 90-day period and during the period 
of automatic stay. See R. 344 to 353. No charges after April 10, 1997 would be allowable. 
According to the affidavit of fees and costs this totals $8,797. In addition to that Scott is 
attempting to recover $2,000 in fees paid to a California bankruptcy attorney. All of those fees 
were incurred during the period of the automatic stay. 
Because the debt sought was purportedly incurred within the 90-days of the bankruptcy all 
fees and costs incurred after April 10, 1997 and prior to November 20, 1997 must be disallowed. 
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IV. SCOTT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE REQUESTED FEES, COSTS 
AND DAMAGES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RECOUPMENT. 
Scott claims that the Doctrine of Recoupment is different from that of set-off, and creates 
a separate basis on which he should be entitled to recover his fees, costs, and damages in this case. 
In spite of that fact, the argument was not raised until Scott's reply brief in support of his motion 
for summary judgment. Clearly the recoupment argument was not a "reply" to the argument raised 
by Ms. Majors in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment. It represented instead a 
completely separate argument which should have been raised in the initial memorandum if it was 
to be considered by the court at all. 
The Rules of Judicial Administration and Civil Procedure do not provide for any briefing 
beyond the reply brief of the party requesting summary judgment. It is not fair to allow totally new 
claims to be raised in such a pleading. Accordingly, the Trial Court should not have even 
considered the Doctrine of Recoupment as a basis of recovery by Scott. 
Nevertheless, the Trial Court clearly did examine the recoupment issue. Like the Court's 
ruling on set-off the Court's ruling on recoupment is in error. The primary difference between 
recoupment and set-off is that set-off is a doctrine particularly prescribed by the bankruptcy code 
while recoupment is not. Recoupment can take place outside the bankruptcy context. This does 
not however change the treatment of such claims where there has been a discharge. The similarity 
in treatment with respect to the discharge provisions of the bankruptcy code was recognized by 
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. In the In re Davidovic case cited by Scott in his memorandum 
in support of motion for summary judgment the 10th Circuit stated in footnote 4: 
We also note but do not decide that a different result may obtain under either or both 
doctrine when a creditor asserts a right to set-off or recoupment in a personal action 
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brought by the debtor alone, rather than an action brought by the Bankruptcy Trustee to 
recover assets for the bankruptcy estate. See Johnson v. Rutherford Hospital. (In re 
Johnson). 13 B.R. 185, 188-189 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn 1981)(holding that 11 USC Section 
524(a)(2) precludes set off of a discharged debt against a post petition judgment in favor 
of the debtor, as opposed to the bankruptcy estate, under the Truth in Lending Act). 
In re Davidovic at 1539n.4. 
Simply seeking an alternative way to recover directly from and against the debtor post 
petition is clearly precluded by the Bankruptcy Code. Section 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act 1978 provides in pertinent part that a discharge in a case under this title 
"(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action the 
employment of process, or any act, to collect, recover, or off-set any such debt [discharged 
under Section 727, 944, 1141, or 1348 of this title] as a personal liability of the debtor, 
or from property of the debtor whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; 
The language of this statute is clear. It prohibits the continuation of an action or any act to 
collect any debt that is the personal liability of the debtor or from the property of the debtor With 
the abandonment of property by the Trustee the property became the property of Ms. Majors. 
While the Doctrine of Recoupment might have provided a separate means to attack the awarding 
of the funds to the Bankruptcy Trustee in the bankruptcy estate, it does not provide any method 
or means whereby additional claims can be made against Ms. Majors. The debts were discharged 
and accordingly the Court's ruling that under the Doctrine of Recoupment Scott may obtain an off-
set against Ms. Majors is clear err. 
V. THE FEES, COSTS, AND DAMAGES AWARDED TO SCOTT ARE EXCESSIVE 
AND/OR UNRECOVERABLE AND RESULT IN DOUBLE PAYMENT. 
A. The Attorneys Fees Requested are Not All Recoverable, 
Even if the Court were to determine that in some fashion the claim for costs, fees or 
damages had not discharged in the bankruptcy, in contravention to the discharge granted by the 
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federal bankruptcy court for the State of California, and that Scott could continue his action in 
order to attempt to garner those cost, fees and damages in the State of Utah. All the fees requested 
are not recoverable in any event. 
In Utah a claim for attorneys fees must be based on statute or contract. Without one of 
those basis no recovery of attorneys fees is allowed. The stated basis of the requested attorneys 
fees in this case is Paragraph 17 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract signed by Scott and Ms. 
Majors.2 This provision states "17. ATTORNEYS FEES. Any action arising out of this Contract, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys fees." The affidavit that 
attorneys fees for Hansen states on Paragraph 5. "To defend interest in Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceedings I was required to hire a California bankruptcy Attorney, Michael J. Gilligan, of Reid 
& Hellier of Riverside, California. Paragraph 6. I was required to pay Michael J. Gilligan 
attorneys fees in the order of $2,000." 
Clearly the fees paid in the bankruptcy proceedings are outside those fees specifically 
awardable in this action. The charges set forth in the affidavit proper show that none of the time 
charged on Page 352 of the record are recoverable under Paragraph 17 of the REPC. Neither is 
any of the time on Page 353 of the record recoverable. None of these charges are directly related 
to enforcing the contract. They are involved either with the bankruptcy proceedings of Ms. Majors 
or the attempt to obtain damages and fees from Ms. Majors. Recovering attorneys fees and costs 
is not an enforcement of the contract. The issue of enforcement of the contract had already been 
decided and resolved at the time of the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Likewise all the fees and 
2Ms. Majors contention is that Scott never signed the agreement until after litigation was 
commenced. 
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costs awarded in the March 10, 1998 order are not recoverable. They deal with the separate action 
brought by Scott to set aside the Lis Pendens filed from the California law suit. 
Because these charges are not within the scope of attorneys fees provision in the contract 
they are excessive and must be denied. 
B. Damages Sought by Scott Are Not Allowable. 
Scott sought to establish additional damages by way of affidavit. The purported affidavit 
is founded in the record on Pages 351-355. The affidavit itself is, however, improper and invalid 
as it has no actual signature of the notary or of the Plaintiff. Therefore the affidavit itself is 
nothing but hearsay and is completely invalid. An examination of the costs sought by Scott shows 
them also to be nonrecoverable. If the judgment awarding Scott the property is upheld all that he 
would be entitled to recover are his costs that he would not have had to expend to acquire the 
property originally. If he would have had purchased the property clearly he would have had his 
origination fee, his fee to the title company, and other costs. To be awarded both the property and 
his costs is to receive double recovery. Likewise the receipt of property taxes for 1997 results in 
double recovery. He cannot receive the rents without being responsible for the costs. 
Furthermore, the costs that he is seeking, postage, miscellaneous long distance phone calls, 
calls to Salt Lake to close the escrow, are completely unsupported by any document or any 
legitimate affidavit. 
The damages sought are improper and were discharged in any event by the bankruptcy 
court. The Trial Court's order must accordingly be reversed. 
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C. Plaintiffs Request for Costs Are Not Allowable. 
In the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements (found at R. 528) Ms. Hansen identifies 
all the requested costs as having been incurred after December 30, 1997. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined costs recoverable as "those fees which are required 
to be paid to the Court and the witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be included in 
the judgment." Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). Overnight delivery charges 
do not fall within that stricture; nor do certified copies, or Recorder's Fees. 
At first blush the filing fees and service of process appear to be the types of costs 
recoverable, but they are not fees in this case. Costs incurred in the California litigation can only 
be recovered in California. 
The Court's award of costs must therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
These matters are before the Court on the basis of the Trial Court's granting motions for 
summary judgment with respect to attorneys fees and the transfer of ownership of the property at 
issue. Material issues of fact exist with respect to the ownership issue. Taking the facts in the light 
most favorable to Ms. Majors, the facts clearly result in Ms. Majors being allowed to keep her 
property. 
The Doctrines of Set Off or Recoupment are not a way to avoid the discharge provisions 
of the bankruptcy code. They are applicable only against the estate of the bankrupt and accordingly 
are only to be applied against the trustee. The actions of the Plaintiff and his counsel in this case 
show clear disregard for the federal bankruptcy laws and the discharge provisions thereof. Because 
the debts were discharged they cannot be pursued against Ms. Majors. 
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Even if the materially disputed facts were ignored and the discharge provisions of the 
federal bankruptcy code were ignored, the award of fees, costs and damages in this case are 
improper. The fees, costs and damages awarded result in a windfall to the Plaintiff, are not 
property supported by evidence, and/or are not recoverable under well established Utah law. Ms. 
Majors therefore respectfully requests this Court overturn the decision of the Trial Court, remand 
this matter for further proceedings with respect to the issue of Scott's breach of the REPC, after 
the decision by the Court of Appeals, and with direction to the Trial Court that all fees, costs and 
damages previously awarded are not recoverable in light of the arguments set forth above. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
DATED this £9^~day of July, 1998. 
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER 
Shawn D. Turner 
MAJORS AP.BRF 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this <*^  "day of July, 1998, I mailed, postage prepaid, a 
copy of the foregoing Motion for Extension of Time to the following: 
Mary Axvn Hansen. 
852 N. 910 E. 
PO Box 1994 
Orem, UT 84059 
K 
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ADDENDUM A 
COPIES OF ORDERS APPEALED FROM 
MARY ANN HANSEN (5200) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
854 NORTH 910 EAST 
P.O. BOX 1994 
OREM, UTAH 84059 
Telephone:(801) 226-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 764-0300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE SCOTT, OftDEf 
JUDGMENT ESTABLISHING 
PLAINTIFF, TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY 
-vs-
LINDA MAJORS, Civil No. 950300019CN 
DEFENDANT. Judge Pat B. Brian 
BASED UPON this Court's Order, entered on or about January 29, 1996, 
granting Plaintiff Summary Judgment of Specific Performance. Plaintiff is hereby awarded 
judgment against Defendant as follows: 
1. Defendant shall convey to Plaintiff fee simple title to the following real 
property located in Summit County, State of Utah: 
so&z z ENGE k 27 
047 I 
Unit 407, Carriage House Condominiums, a Utah Condominium 
Project, together with an undivided 2/325ths ownership interest 
in and to the common areas and facilities of the project as the 
same are identified and established in the record of survey map 
recorded August 10, 1988 as Entry No. 295097 and the 
condominium declarations recorded August 10, 1988 as Entry No. 
295098 in Book 489 at Page 15 of the official records in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
2. That pursuant to the Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") the 
Plaintiff is obligated to purchase the subject real property from the Defendant in the 
amount of Thirty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($37,500.00). However, the 
Plaintiff is allowed an offset against the purchase price the amount of Thirty Five Thousand 
Five Hundred Sixty Three Dollars and Twenty Four Cents ($35,563.24), which is the total 
sum of Plaintiffs attorney's fees, costs and damages in this matter. Therefore, Plaintiff 
shall deliver to the Escrow Agent, in escrow, the total consideration for the subject property 
in the amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Six Dollars and Seventy Six Cents 
($1,936.76). 
3. The closing of the conveyance (the "Closing") shall be held at the 
offices of Associated Title Company, located at 1755 Prospector Avenue, Park City, Utah 
(the" Escrow Agent"), 
at such other place and time as shall be mutually agreed to, in writing, by the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant. At Closing, the following shall occur, each of which shall be considered 
a condition precedent to the other and ail of which shall be considered as taking place 
simultaneously: 
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a. The Defendant shall execute and deliver to the Escrow Agent, 
in escrow, a general warranty deed for the subject property. 
b. The Plaintiff shall deliver to the Escrow Agent, in escrow, the 
consideration for the subject property as outlined above. 
c. The Plaintiff and Defendant shall execute and deliver to each 
other such other documents (including without limitation closing statements) and take such 
other actions as necessary and appropriate to effectuate the Closing in accordance 
herewith and with the Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
d. That if Defendant fails to comply with any of the above-
referenced items necessary for Closing, then Associated Title Company shall be required 
to execute all necessary documents including but not limited to closing statement and 
general warranty deed. In the event that Associated Title is required to sign and or execute 
any Closing documents, Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that said 
documents will have the same effect as if signed and executed by Defendant. 
DATED this \^><D day of December, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
<ZL uL. 
Pit B. Brian tSgt f r o O ^ # 
Third District Court J u d g e ^ % ^ # ^ 
'**'>«,&sy 
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MARY ANN HANSEN (5200) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
854 NORTH 910 EAST 
P.O. BOX 1994 
OREM, UTAH 84059 
Telephone: (801) 226-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 764-0300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE SCOTT, 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER VESTING 
Plaintiff, TITLE OF REAL PROPERTY IN 
PLAINTIFF 
vs. : 
LINDA MAJORS, 
Defendant. Civil No. 950600019CN 
Judge 
Plaintiff's Motion for Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff came before this 
Court for hearing on Wednesday, February 18, 1998. Plaintiff was represented by Mary c 
bu,+ w&* represented H townsol A ( Ann Hansen. Defendant was not present nor wtac cho roproocntod by counjol. Based 
upon Plaintiffs Motion for Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff, the Plaintiffs 
supporting memoranda, the Affidavits of Steve Scott and Mary Ann Hansen, Memorandum 
of Costs and Disbursements, and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, the pleadings on file with the 
Court, oral arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing thereon; 
Bfifei'7 r* 5&E n r . 1 n.Slfi 
By. 
FEB 1 8 1998 
Third District Court £ M 
Dtputy Clerk, Summit County 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Pursuant to Rule 70 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court hereby 
vests title to Plaintiff, Steve Scott, of real property located in Summit County, State of Utah 
and more particularly described as follows: 
Unit 407, Carriage House Condominiums, a Utah Condominium 
Project, together with an undivided 2/325ths ownership interest 
in and to the common areas and facilities of the project as the 
same are identified and established in the record of survey map 
recorded August 10,1988 as Entry No. 295097 and the 
condominium declarations recorded August 10, 1988 as Entry No. 
295098 in Book 489 at Page 15 of the official records in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
("The Property"). 
2. That any right, title or interest of the Defendant in the Property is 
hereby extinguished. 
* that Haintiti is awdltletl a jullymmil fui uiluinay's fcab in LIIU J I I IUUI I I 
Of OhP TT™' ' i r ij m mm u (fr \ ruin rw\y fcgfrJ 
•4 That Plaintill ib elwaiaea a juagment tor costs in the amount ot ^wo 
kb.nHrorl Frmrtmn Pnlllll I ( V 1 1 HP) -
5. The Summit County Court Clerk currently has in their possession funds 
in the amount of $1,936.76. The Court Clerk is hereby ordered to disburse said funds in 
the following manner 
QfV&rr 7 v * . 
a. Pay 1997 Summit County real property taxes on the Property, 
Serial Number CHC-407, in the amount of in the amount Six Hundred Fifty Three Dollars 
and Ninety §ix Cents ($653.96). 
±1 Pay PlaintilTa jlloinuy, Mdiy Ann I lanocn, Twelve I lundred 
Fifty Tour Dullma ($1,254.00) fui miuiimy'b faeb diiU iub&. 
c. Pay Defendant Twenty Eight Dollars and Eighty Cents ($28.80) 
which is the balance held by the Court Clerk. 
DATED this jh day of February, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
William B. Bohling | j £ | J ^ i ? I ' 
Third District Court Judges = OQJ*? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING '%,$mmx\^ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Judgment and Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff, postage prepaid, this /o 
day of February, 1998. 
Linda Majors 
P.O. Box 1418 
Twin Peaks, CA 92391 
M&-
G/to/r, ry^~„ 0 5 1 £ 
MARY ANN HANSEN (5200) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
854 NORTH 910 EAST 
P.O. BOX 1994 
OREM, UTAH 84059 
Telephone: (801) 226-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 764-0300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE SCOTT, 0 £ D > £ R . 
ATTORNEY'S FEES JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA MAJORS, 
Defendant. Civil No. 950600019CN 
Judge 
Plaintiffs Motion for Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff came before this 
Court for hearing on Wednesday, February 18, 1998. Also, Plaintiffs Petition to Nullify 
Defendant's Lien, Civil No. 980600027 came before this Court at the same time. Plaintiff 
was represented by Mary Ann Hansen. Defendant was represented by Dana Facemyer 
who made a limited appearance. The Court entered a Judgment and Order Vesting Title 
of Real Property in Plaintiff in this matter and entered an Order Nullifying Lien in Civil No. 
980600027. 
ILTD 
MAR f o
 /ssg 
8 y _ j W « O f e W c t court 
County 
The Court requested that Plaintiffs counsel prepare a supplemental order within ten 
days as to attorney fees. Therefore, based upon Plaintiffs Affidavit as to Attorney's Fees, 
and the pleadings on file with the Court, and for good cause appearing thereon; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff is awarded a judgment for attorney's fees and costs in 
the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Four Dollars ($1,254.00). 
2. That the Summit County Court Clerk is ordered to disburse funds 
escrowed in this matter to Plaintiffs attorney, Mary Ann Hansen, in the amount of Twelve 
Hundred Fifty Four dollars ($1,254.00). 
DATED this lb day of " 7 K > ^ > U _ 1998. 
8GG;zZ3fiE9$i 
ADDENDUM B 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
11 USC § 524 Effect of Discharge 
(a) A discharge in a case under this title— 
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement of continuation of an action, the 
employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a 
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; 
11 USC § 553. Setoff 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363 of this title, this 
title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such 
creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case, except to the 
extent that-
(1) the claim of such creditor against the debtor is disallowed other than under section 
502(b)(3) of this title; 
(2) such claim was transferred, by and entity other than the debtor, to such creditor-
(A) after the commencement of the case; or 
(B)(i) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and 
(ii) white the debtor was insolvent; or 
(3) the debt owed to the debtor by such creditor was incurred by such creditor-
(A) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; 
(B) while the debtor was insolvent; and 
(C) for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff against the debtor. 
(b)(1) Except with respect to a setoff of a kind described in section 362 (b)(6), 362(b)(B7),, 
365(h)(2), or 365(i)(2) of this title, if a creditor offsets a mutual debt owing to the debtor 
against a claim against the debtor on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the 
petition, then the trustee may recover from such creditor the amount so offset to the extent that 
any insufficiency on the date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency on the latter of~ 
(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and 
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing 
of the petition on which there is an insufficiency. 
(2) In this subsection, "insufficiency" means amount, if any, by which a claim against the 
debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the holder of such claim. 
(c) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and 
during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition. 
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*949 Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
PART I. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 
RULES OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
CHAPTER 4. OPERATION OF 
THE COURTS 
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Current with amendments received through 
11-15-97 
RULE 4-501. MOTIONS 
Intent. To establish a uniform procedure for 
filing motions, supporting memoranda and 
documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting 
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited 
dispositions. 
Applicability. This rule shall apply to motion 
practice in all district courts except proceedings 
before the court commissioners and small claims 
cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for 
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary 
relief. 
Statement of the Rule. 
(1) Filing and Service of Motions and 
Memoranda. 
(a) Motion and Supporting Memoranda. All 
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte 
matters, shall be accompanied by a 
memorandum of points and authorities, 
appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations 
by page number to relevant portions of 
depositions, exhibits or other documents relied 
upon in support of the motion. Memoranda 
supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in 
paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the 
court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte 
application is made to file an over-length 
memorandum, the application shall state the 
length of the principal memorandum, and if the 
memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the 
application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion, and all supporting documentation. If 
the responding party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion 
within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter to the court for decision as provided in 
paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply Memorandum. The moving party 
may serve and file a reply memorandum within 
five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
*950 (d) Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to 
file a reply memorandum, either party may 
notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the 
court for decision. The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and 
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." 
The notification shall contain a certificate of 
mailing to all parties. If neither party files a 
notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for Summary Judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in Support of a Motion. 
The points and authorities in support of a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the movant relies. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a 
Motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
shall begin with a section that contains a 
concise statement of material facts as to which 
the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer 
to those portions of the record upon which the 
opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall 
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the 
movant's facts that are disputed. All material 
facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to 
the record shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing 
party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, 
or requested by the parties as provided in 
paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action or any issues in the 
action on the merits with prejudice, either party 
at the time of filing the principal memorandum 
in support of or in opposition to a motion may 
file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the 
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to 
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the 
dispositive issue or set of issues governing the 
granting or denial of the motion has been 
authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the 
court shall notify the requesting party. When a 
request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the 
requesting party that the matter shall be heard 
and the requesting party shall schedule the 
matter for hearing and notify all parties of the 
date and time. 
*951 (e) In those cases where a hearing is 
granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, 
memorandum of points and authorities and all 
documents supporting or opposing the motion 
shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
matter at least two working days before the date 
set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked 
as courtesy copies and indicate the date and 
time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not 
be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is 
made at the time the parties file their principal 
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be 
deemed waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at 
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial 
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard 
after that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited Dispositions. Upon motion and 
notice and for good cause shown, the court may 
grant a request for an expedited disposition in 
any case where time is of the essence and 
compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion 
does not raise significant legal issues and could 
be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone Conference. The court on its 
own motion or at a party's request may direct 
arguments of any motion by telephone 
conference without court appearance. A 
verbatim record shall be made of all telephone 
arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by 
counsel. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1996.] 
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